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, Group 1). The central bazaars, in addition to including their prosperous shopkeepers and traders, comprised a vast array of productive activities -mostly handicrafts such as clothing, household goods, metal wares, and jewelry -grouped into tens of corporations, each located along a single street or alley.8 It is not clear whether these corporations ever provided a sense of solidarity and organization strong enough to allow them to be used for political purposes in the Mandate era. A number of them had already disappeared under the impact of the European commercial invasion, and many others had seen better days. Moreover, most had come under direct state supervision in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, a situation that French Mandatory authorities sought to reinforce. The great bazaars frequently went on strike during the Mandate era, but whether they did so under their own volition or because the nationalist leadership forced them to is a question worthy of further investigation.9 Some quarters had a significantly higher concentration of wealthy residents than did others -in particular, 'Amara (home of the local religious aristocracy) and al-Qaymariyya (known for its wealthy merchants) -and several displayed a certain economic homogeneity, although this was not true of the Christian and Jewish quarters. Residents of some exclusively Muslim quarters seem to have formed communities because of their involvement in similar occupations or trades. However, these individuals did not necessarily belong to the same ethnic group or come from the same place of origin. Their fairly high level of collective consciousness and purpose resulted from occupational and kinship ties that had developed over long periods of permanent residence in the quarter. Ties of descent and residence encouraged neighborhood and even quarter-wide solidarity and disposed local residents toward collective action.
The quarters of the old city are characterized by their walls, narrow and crooked streets, and inward-looking houses built around courtyards.'? By the mid-1930s, the old city contained about one-fourth of the Damascene population. But with rapid demographic growth in the interwar period, and the city's physical expansion to the northwest, old Damascus's share of the city's total population diminished considerably.
The second section of Damascus (Table 1 , Group 2) includes the quarters and subquarters on the northern, western, and southern peripheries of the old city, which lay just outside the ancient wall. This section contained forty percent of the city's population in the mid-1930s. Most of its quarters were outgrowths of the old city which had begun to take shape in the later Middle Ages and eventually came to be fully integrated into the life of the town. Several were exclusively residential and catered to the wealthy classes. Suq Sartja dated from the fourteenth century and in the nineteenth became known as "Little Istanbul," owing to its popularity with the class of Ottoman functionaries; al-Qanawat was established as early as the sixteenth century but assumed its cosmopolitan ambience in the nineteenth century. Both quarters housed prominent political leaders of the late Ottoman and Mandate periods. Others, like 'Uqayba, which was north of the old city and became in the 1930s one of the centers of modern industry, were less exclusive." Al-Qassa', to the northeast, became an appendage of Bab Tuma in the early twentieth century, housing wealthier Christian families who had found life in Bab Tuma's crowded ancient dwellings increasingly difficult.'2 The greater security provided by the Ottoman state after the 1860 massacres in Damascus, which the European powers reinforced, certainly contributed to the development of this new quarter beyond the old fortified walls of Bab Tuma.
The third section of Damascus (Table 1 , Group 3), popularly referred to as al-Maydan, took its shape as a suburb after the Ottoman conquest of Syria in the sixteenth century.13 It is actually a long, narrow series of quarters and subquarters extending southwards into the grain-producing Hawran. Al-Maydan did not have as high a population density as did those quarters closer to the old city, and its commercial and residential buildings were rarely more than one storey high. Its population in the mid-thirties, which constituted nearly a fifth of the city's total, was the most socially heterogeneous in Damascus: it was filled with Hawrani peasants, Druze highlanders, Arab tribes in winter, and a small Christian community of artisans and merchant-moneylenders (in Bab Musalla), all living a rather rudimentary lifestyle. It also housed a wealthy community of Muslim grain and livestock merchant-moneylenders which had grown out of the local janissary forces (yerliyye) that dominated the Maydan until the nineteenth century. As the wholesale provisions market of the city, the Maydan contained few bazaars or industries. Rather, it featured a significant number of storehouses (hawasil) that handled the grain and livestock trade that came from the Hawran and Palestine and for provisioning the annual pilgrimage to Mecca which originated in Damascus.'4 Beginning in the nineteenth century, al-Maydan became slowly integrated into Damascus as the forces of agrarian commercialization in Syria developed, but during the Mandate it was still characterized by sharp social conflicts and a high crime rate. Because its largely immigrant population was poor, came from ethnically and geographically diverse origins, and were forced to settle in al-Maydan where land and dwelling rents were among the lowest in Damascus, the quarter was unable to develop a single collective consciousness, let alone a single identifiable political leadership. Certain communities in al-Maydan actively participated in nationalist resistance efforts during the Mandate, but it was virtually impossible to organize for collective action.
The fourth section of Damascus (Table 1 , Group 4) was also its most sparsely and most recently settled section. In the mid-1930s its quarters lying to the northwest of the old city up to the slopes of Jabal Qasyin housed only fifteen percent of the city's population. Several quarters within the section deserve special mention because each had its own distinctive characteristics. The closest to old Damascus in its physical and social features was al-Salhiyya. Originally a medieval village, it enjoyed a renaissance in the late nineteenth century. Here could be found the typical array of pious foundations, mosques, and madrasas (religious schools) common in the older quarters across the Barada.'5 Between al-Salhiyya and old Damascus arose during the Mandate several modern garden districts (the best known being al-Shuhada', 'Arnus, and al-Jisr) which housed French officials and other members of the town's small European community in addition to a growing number of wealthy Muslim families. Built in this area were new government schools, the parliament, European-style hotels and social clubs, and a burgeoning modern commercial district along the now-famous al-Salhiyya street. Closest to the old city were Marje Square and the various buildings housing the French administration, including the Serail. This new center of urban life was well laid out with paved roads; the absence of walls created a sense of openness and security.
Further up the hill lay al-Muhajirin, a distant suburb settled by Muslim refugees from Crete in the late nineteenth century.16 The other significant quarter in section four was the Hayy al-Akrad, which was originally a village established by Kurdish settlers during the reign of Saladin and which became a refuge in the nineteenth century for immigrant Kurds who were not especially welcome further inside Damascus. There, on uncultivated terrain, they built their quarter and organized their own paramilitary forces. In contrast to the well-planned alMuhajirin with its prosperous inhabitants and its streets laid out at right angles, the Kurdish quarter was generally poor and its streets were a maze for protective purposes. In time the Kurds, who engaged in farming and the livestock trade, lost many of their particular customs and even their language as they became more fully a part of Arab Damascus. Their clan structure, however, was not as easily dissolved. Clan heads continued to exercise much local influence in the quarter even after some moved further inside the city into wealthier residential quarters like Suq Saruja in the last half of the nineteenth century.'7
URBAN LEADERSHIP
The older quarters remained important focal points of social and political organization, despite various external pressures which broke through their selfcontained and isolated structures. Moreover, each quarter tried to preserve its own personality during the Mandate. A typical older quarter had its own local leaders, including a mukhtar (headman, called aghi in some quarters), the imams (prayer leaders) of the local mosque, and the wu/aha' (notables) who were usually the quarter's wealthy landowners and merchants. Together they sat on the council of the quarter (majlis al-hayy) which acted as a mini-government to protect quarter residents from excessive state interference, to represent the quarter in disputes with other quarters, and to mediate internal conflicts. Often one of these traditional leaders could be found on the Municipal Council (majlis albaladT) of Damascus. At the lower end of the quarter's social scale, community life revolved around kinship groups, religious associations, and street gangs.18
Protection from government agents was one of the most important services that secular and religious dignitaries rendered their neighbors, friends, and clients. During the Mandate, when tax collectors in Damascus made their rounds to investigate individuals who had not paid their head or property taxes, they were not only accompanied by a police officer but also by the mukhtar and the imam of the quarter. In fact, in certain quarters tax collectors were not allowed to conduct their investigations unless they secured the agreement of the majlis alhayy or its leading notable beforehand. In the case of Suq Midhat Pasha, which received protection from the militant Shaghur quarter, custom dictated that tax collectors had to go to the home of the notable to request ("often beg for") a written introduction before entering the sfuq. Without this document, the tax collector could conduct no official business there.'9 During the Mandate, the older quarters also maintained informal dTwans (councils) where local dignitaries met with delegations from all classes, communities, and interest groups to discuss the critical issues of the day. These dTwans were usually held in the outer salons (ma.cdfa or salamlik) of the great residences of the quarter belonging to its wealthy landowning-bureaucratic and mercantile families. Such gatherings contributed far more than newspapers and other media to the formation and reinforcement of public opinion. Since the Mandate authorities frequently censored or suspended publication of newspapers and magazines, the dTwan served as a great storehouse of much fresher and more confidential information. Public political consciousness in the cities was advanced far beyond the level of education of the common people, who were largely illiterate and thus had little direct need for newspapers.20
The contribution of prominent families in the quarter to the political life of the city was considerable. They were instrumental in mobilizing local forces to protest and resist or to support the government. They organized public gatherings in squares, cafes, theaters, and gardens; circulated petitions; boycotted elections and also foreign concessions and goods; shut down the great bazaars; raised funds; disseminated political information; and gauged the pulse of the city for the "beys" [begawait] (the appellation given the nationalist leadership during the Mandate).21 These notable families had traditionally played the role of patron and broker, intervening on behalf of their clients with the government or mediating their personal disputes. By offering services to their neighbors and friends, they guaranteed loyalty and support and, in return, created for themselves an advantageous stability in the quarter. Their access to the state depended on their ability and willingness to maintain the social peace, which in turn depended on the degree of their independent influence in local society. Patronage was the source of this independent influence.22
Because the population of Damascus nearly doubled in the two decades following the French occupation of Syria in 1920, the older quarters began to lose their intimacy and warmth, and their emotional support systems broke down. They became crowded and increasingly impersonal, owing to an unprecedented in-migration of peasants and tribes from outlying areas and to improved health conditions and facilities which lowered infant mortality rates.23 The delicate balance of forces in the quarters and the positions of influence of the notable families was upset by the pressure of increased population. The great families found it increasingly difficult to absorb the growing number of newcomers to Damascus into their personal networks. Patronage became a more complex and competitive operation, which a number of the notable families could no longer manage satisfactorily. Feeling increasingly claustrophobic and threatened by the changing character of their quarters, especially their growing facelessness, some of the wealthier families in the old quarters left for the new garden suburbs to the town's northwest.24
Contributing to this flight during the Mandate was the widening social and cultural gulf between the modern educated and European-clad upper and uppermiddle classes, which produced the urban leadership, and the largely unlettered and tradition-bound masses. The sweeping structural changes, initiated in the nineteenth century, helped to erode patronage systems, promoting instead an increasingly differentiated class structure. As class distinctions became more obvious, the wealthier and Europeanized classes found reason to distance themselves from the popular classes. One simple way was to move out of their ancestral quarters into the cleaner, safer, and more spacious areas on the outskirts of Damascus. Muslim notable families who linked their interests to the Mandate authorities or to European commercial enterprises were among the very first to leave. They could do so conveniently since their political influence was no longer dependent on building and maintaining patronage networks in the popular quarters.
A related factor precipitating this flight was the growing inadequacy of the ancestral courtyard house in the old quarter.25 It became in time less able to accommodate the changes taking place in the structure and orientation of the upper-class family. In the course of two or three generations (that is, by the early twentieth century), the extended family or clan had developed its own distinct economic branches. Within the extended family, a hierarchy of power and influence became established and rival branches emerged.26 Members of the wealthier branches preferred to move into their own homes, designed along European lines and reflecting the new patterns of social relations between the sexes and the generations. The availability of space in the gardens to the northwest of the city proved to be ideally suited to their needs. Moreover, improved technology brought new advantages for the privileged, such as running water and other sanitary devices which could not easily be installed in older homes. At the same time, paved roads and motorized vehicles brought the city-center within reasonable reach of outlying areas.
Not all wealthy families found it convenient to make such a move. The landed families who already owned the garden districts, which were to become modern Damascus, had a distinct advantage and interest in doing so. But an important determinant was the source of a family's wealth. Many could meet the financial demands of moving but were unable to leave because of the source of their livelihood. For instance, merchants whose enterprises depended on their daily presence in the city-center could not risk such a move. By contrast, families who lived off of farm or urban real estate rents, (and who thus had much less of a need to be in daily contact with the old commercial center of the city) could more easily afford the comforts of suburban life. Merchants in traditional businesses not directly linked to European commercial interests also tended to be those who had not acquired a modern education, Ottoman trappings, or European tastes, and who therefore were set apart from the absentee landowningbureaucratic families that had served the Ottoman state as a provincial aristocracy of service.27 Muslim merchant families tended to be more tradition-bound and, hence, more quarter-bound. Meanwhile, a cosmopolitan, landed upper crust, with a new attitude toward property relations, and newly acquired European Unlike those notables who collaborated with the French, the most influential nationalist leaders were careful not to sever ties with the popular quarters. They retained large personal followings which cut across class and even confessional lines. However, their actual physical presence became more infrequent. At election time, on feasts, and at other commemorative occasions, such as the annual Maysaluin memorial or the Prophet's birthday, Jamil Mardam and Shukri alQuwwatli could always be seen amongst the common people in the old quarters, where they opened the outer salons of their spacious family residences to supporters and well-wishers. Nationalist chiefs always listed their ancestral quarters as permanent residences and in election primaries they ran on their quarter's list. Because their new suburban houses were inconveniently and sometimes inaccessibly located, it was necessary to maintain their traditional homes for social and political purposes.30 On lesser occasions, nationalist chiefs were rarely present. Surprisingly, the task of organizing strikes, demonstrations, and nationalist rallies did not require their presence.
During the Mandate period, a growing division of labor developed within the independence movement, particularly after the failure of the Great Revolt, which was followed by the nationalist elite's decision to adopt the different but clearly more comfortable strategy of "honorable cooperation" with the French. This strategy placed a greater emphasis on diplomacy, supported by carefully orchestrated strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations which aimed to discredit rival factions of notables collaborating with the French High Commission and to convince the French that the nationalists alone should be invited to form a national government in Syria.
The collapse of the Great Revolt had discredited revolutionary armed struggle as a viable strategy. It not only heavily damaged the material interests of the nationalist elite but it caused massive hemorrhaging in the ranks. Afterwards, the nationalist leadership no longer sought immediately to overturn the Frenchcontrolled system of rule, but something rather less: the modification of the existing system and the gradual relaxation of French control. To survive, nationalists had to pursue more delicate relationships with the French. Meanwhile, the French High Commission, under pressure from Paris to develop a more consistent and hence less offensive imperial policy in Syria, welcomed and encouraged this new strategy.3
After the suppression of the Great Revolt in 1927, nationalist leaders in Syria's major cities organized themselves into a new political organization, the National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya). In each town, the Bloc was not a unified or wellintegrated political party but rather was an alliance of like-minded urban political leaders, each heading an autonomous machine which was used in the common cause of national independence.32 During the Mandate, a combination of elements drawn from the traditional and modern sectors of urban society powered these political machines. Although the lines between the traditional and modern sectors were often blurred because urban society was still evolving gradually and unevenly, one distinction was clear: the support of the traditional sectors of society stemmed less from ideological considerations than did the support of the modern sectors. In his own quarter, the Bloc chief built and reinforced his personal network by using his inherited wealth and family connections to funnel crucial benefits and services to a broad array of individuals from classes beneath his own. Despite an ongoing process of class polarization and hence an increased opportunity for class conflict, society in the popular quarters was still organized according to relations of personal dependence. At the top of the social pyramid stood the great urban-absentee landowning families, such as Mardam-Beg, Al-QuwwatlT, Al-Barfud, Al-Bakri, and Al-Ghazzi, from which the nationalist leadership of Damascus emerged and, in particular, the National Bloc, the most effective political alliance of the Mandate era.
As National Bloc chiefs became increasingly preoccupied with diplomatic bargaining at the summit of politics, they were obliged to leave the day-to-day task of organizing and maintaining their patronage systems to members of their families, personal secretaries, and other prominent personalities in their political orbit. In other words, as Bloc leaders began to distance themselves socially and physically from the city-center, they turned to other intermediaries who could more conveniently maintain face-to-face contacts and purvey the material benefits and services which buttressed each leader's personal network. Prominent merchants and religious leaders in the quarters were two such natural intermediaries.
Merchants and imams in the popular quarters supported the National Bloc for a variety of reasons, but mainly because they perceived foreign rule as the primary cause of their seemingly endless misfortunes. The French-imposed banking and tax systems were inimical to the financial interests of the Muslim commercial bourgeoisie. The partition of greater Syria severely damaged commerce and industry, and the French were either unwilling or unable to permit merchants and industrialists to have access to foreign capital, giving them few investment outlets. Many, although by no means all,33 saw the French as robbers of Syria's national wealth and the major obstacle to economic development. At the same
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time, the upper layers of the Muslim commercial bourgeoisie were closely intertwined with the absentee landowning class in the Syrian capital from which the major National Bloc leaders emerged. They maintained social and financial relations through marriage and joint ventures. Merchants provided loans to landowners and often handled the distribution of their crops. They generally responded promptly to the Bloc's call for strikes and boycotts. The new strategy developed by the Bloc in the wake of the Great Revolt, with its emphasis on patient diplomacy, appealed to a commercial bourgeoisie that had suffered considerable financial misfortune during the Revolt and therefore feared continued political instability. The merchant classes had reason to support the Bloc's new tactics. The Bloc would not resort to violent confrontations or full-scale rebellion again, unless the French proved completely intransigent and purposely closed off all access to the High Commission. However, although merchant families supported the National Bloc with funds and their own personal networks of artisans, small shopowners, and peddlers in the quarters and bazaars, rarely did they become official members of the Bloc or of any other nationalist organization. Their participation in nationalist politics came about through their personal association with individual nationalist leaders.34
Muslim religious leaders in Damascus, a number of whom belonged to mercantile families, were also of invaluable service to the nationalist movement. In general, the religious establishment's interests and influence had been declining for several generations, owing to increased government control over their institutions and a much altered intellectual climate. Traditional ideas -historically the monopoly of the 'ulamai -began to lose their influence with the educated elites, and the traditional activities of the Culami', as interpreters of the law, educators, and heads of the mystic orders, declined in social value. Less and less significance came to be attached to posts in the religious institutions whereas greater wealth, power, and status accrued to those individuals in the new, modern branches of administration, and from large-scale landownership. This is not to suggest that religious solidarity among the Arabs had vanished; it still existed alongside other loyalties to family, tribe, ethnic and confessional group, neighborhood, and village. But all these ties had been challenged by the rise of new loyalties, such as the rise of secular nationalism, that had accompanied the general structural changes begun in the nineteenth century.35 Religious leaders suffered further humiliations under the French, who, as a Christian power, tried to impose direct supervision over such religious institutions as the awqaf (pious trusts), which often provided a major portion of their incomes. Equally damaging to their interests was the French effort to denigrate the influence of Islam by relegating it to the status of one religion among many. A beleaguered religious establishment, ranging from ranking legal scholars and judges to preachers in the local mosques, supported the resistance to foreign hegemony in Syria.
Although the influence of religion and the status of religious leaders had declined, these individuals had not lost their ability to shape public opinion among the illiterate and the uneducated in the popular quarters. For most urbanites, the mosque and masjid continued to be the central institution in their lives, giving preachers the opportunity to argue for resistance to the French and defense of traditional society in religious terms. To the common people, nationalism was still only a code word for the defense of Islam against foreign aggression, despite ongoing efforts by secular nationalists, including the National Bloc leadership, to dilute the Islamic content of nationalist ideology. As long as Islam had a grip on the minds of the common people, religious leaders were able to reinforce their own positions as guardians of the faith and the culture, if not of the nation.36
Although wealthy merchants and imams recruited clients, financed various nationalist activities, and helped to organize their quarters and the bazaars on a political footing, neither group was able to pose a challenge to the National Bloc's control over nationalism or its domination of local politics during the Mandate. Whereas merchants and imams remained bound up in the closeness of quarter life, the marketplace, and the mosque, having little or no opportunity to break out of this restrictive environment, the nationalist leadership was able to devote its undivided attention to politics on a grander scale. Because many nationalist chiefs could live off land rents collected by their families, they had little need to seek full-time employment. It was during the Mandate that a class of professional politicians arose in Damascus and other Syrian towns. Hailing from affluent families, with a long history of administrative service and with a common upbringing, education, and set of political experiences, the nationalist elite was eminently (and almost exclusively) qualified to represent Damascus at the summit of politics. Therefore, as long as urban society continued to regard these individuals as the "natural" leaders of the opposition to the French, they could expect the continued support of merchants and the religious establishment.
Merchants and imams enhanced their personal status by associating with nationalist chiefs. But this enhancement alone was not sufficient to ensure their long-term loyalty. It was also expected that once a nationalist leader reached the heights of government, he would reward his followers. Hence, allegiance might be offered with the knowledge that returns in the form of government contracts, licenses, jobs in the central administration and municipality, new mosques, paved roads, sewage systems, and other facilities might be in the offing in the long run.
There was fierce competition among nationalists for access to the French. Only this access would give a leader control of government offices and servicesthe most valuable form of patronage. Competition for clientele networks was equally fierce, for only those networks could prove a leader's local power and indispensability to the French. Competition in both arenas was closely intertwined; success in one depended on success in the other.
QABADAYAT
One figure in the quarters who could give the nationalist leader a decisive edge in competition for clientele during the Mandate was the local gang leader, the qaba.diay (pl. qabadayat), or, in the patois of Damascus, the zgrirt. 37 Probably no individual with independent influence in the quarters was closer to the common man than was the qabaday. He was something akin to an institution. Each quarter had its own set of historical figures who were glorified from one generation to the next. In time, an ideal type was formed, one that characterized the qaba.ddy as strong, honorable, the protector of the feeble and the poor as well as of the religious minorities, the upholder of Arab traditions and customs, and the guardian of popular culture. He was hospitable to strangers, always pious, and a clean liver.38 This image placed far less emphasis on the qaba.diy's darker side, his shady dealings, his preference for physical coercion, and even his "mortal" crimes for personal gain. The common people clearly differentiated between the qabadaiyt and the zu'crn or hoodlums who ran protection rackets (khuwa) in the quarters and bazaars, although in reality such distinctions were hazy.39 A qaba.ddy might eventually become fairly well-to-do, but what distinguished him from the dignitaries of the quarter were his significantly lower social origins, his general want of formal education, his outspoken preference for traditional attire and customs, and the much narrower range of his interests and contacts, all of which accorded him a less exalted status than that enjoyed by merchants or religious leaders.40 He survived best in the traditional milieu of the self-contained quarter with its inwardness and narrowly defined interests. There he was needed to provide physical protection from hostile external forces and extra-legal mechanisms for settling personal disputes. But, by the time of the Mandate, the qaba-.diy had begun to feel threatened by the pressures of change created by rapid urbanization, the growth of a market-oriented economy, and the rise of new classes and institutions outside the popular quarters. This period was a transitional phase in the life of the Syrian city, and in the organization and functions of its quarters; the qaba.day survived it, although not without difficulty. Successful business enterprises helped to vault the Kilawi family into the social limelight of Bab al-Jabiyya. Neighbors began to ask for favors or assistance and in no time they built up a solid core of followers and clients from among the poorer elements of the quarter, some of whom were personally loyal to Abu 'AIT. The result was that Abui CAll was able to put together his own gang, composed mainly of unemployed youth and casual laborers.
In the early 1920s, as the KilawTs began to accumulate capital, they were able to purchase a fairly large apartment in the heart of their quarter, one with a special salon for entertaining. This salon also was used as an informal courtroom where the KilawTs, now much trusted in Bab al-Jabiyya, served as administrators of extra-legal justice, arbitrating or mediating disputes between individuals and families who for one reason or another were not comfortable going before the religious or civil courts. The Kilawis also lent their salon to poorer families for wedding parties and other social functions, and it eventually became one of the meeting places of the roving dTwan. Abu CAll claimed that he and his brothers never asked for money or other material rewards for their hospitality and services. But they did expect personal loyalty to the family, which they acquired as the KilawT network grew and the family name came to be mentioned with both reverence and fear.
One of the most prominent features of urban life in Damascus was the Cariida or traditional parades held in the quarters to celebrate some religious event such as a circumcision, the return of the pilgrimage, or the Prophet's birthday. These occasions allowed the youth of one quarter to compete with the youth of neighboring quarters in wrestling matches, sword games, horseracing, and the like. The honor of the quarter was always at stake in these events, as were specific controversies over turf and freedom of movement. Certain quarters were known to be long-standing rivals, most notably Suq Saruja and al-Salhiyya,48 and Shaghur and Bab al-Jabiyya. Yet another way in which Abui CAl al-KilawT reinforced his status in the quarter was to lead his stalwarts in street fights against rival gangs of Shaghuir.
By the early twentieth century, however, the parades had begun to assume secular dimensions as they came to mark political events such as the election of a deputy, the return of an exile, the Young Turk revolt of 1908, or the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911.49 This politicization accelerated during the Mandate, and acts of defiance against the French and their collaborators highlighted the continued independence of life in the quarters. But, equally important, as political consciousness rose in the quarters, the fierce rivalries between them were transformed into an alliance of quarters against the French. The narrowness and insularity of quarter life began to break down as the scope for political activity widened.
The Great Revolt of 1925 hastened the erosion of many of the traditional social and political barriers and rivalries between quarters and helped to bind them together in a common front against the French. There is little doubt that the many stories of individual heroism which quickly became part of the local history and mythology of the Revolt helped many a young man to enhance his reputation in the popular quarters of the city, enabling him to achieve the status of qabaday. In fact, there was a noticeable turnover of qaba.dayat at this time, owing to the emergence of new heroes during the Revolt who replaced those who had been killed. Probably the most respected and esteemed qaba.day of his day was Hasan al-Kharrat, the nightwatchman of Shaghur, who led a rebel attack on Like the great merchants and the imams of the local mosques, the qabadayat rarely joined the National Bloc or any other political organization. Rather, their affiliation and loyalty was to one or another of the Bloc chiefs. Abiu All alKilawT's allegiance was to NasTb al-Bakrl not to the Bloc's executive council.
The qabadiayat were typically more important to a nationalist leader's political machine in the quarters than were the merchants or religious figures. The Bloc chief's resources were limited, especially when in and out of jail or in temporary exile; therefore the recruitment and maintenance of his clientele required considerable finesse. He generally preferred to devote his personal attention to winning and sustaining followings among the wealthier families of the quarters; and, with these he made certain that he was able to maintain regular personal contacts at all times. When the National Bloc chief began to distance himself from his ancestral quarter, he had to depend more heavily on intermediaries to dispense favors and services to the larger mass of poorer residents with whom he probably never came into direct contact. Merchants, whose status was based on wealth, philanthropy, and religious piety, were among those intermediaries who assumed this function for the politicians. But as class differentiation evolved during the Mandate, merchants increasingly began to take less and less interest in the poor and their individual problems. They neither found ample time for, nor were they well-disposed toward, the poor. Philanthropy, after all, did not require regular contact with the lower classes. Some members of the Muslim religious establishment also placed a greater distance between themselves and the common people. Others, however, including preachers in the popular quarters, actually strengthened their influence among the destitute and the illiterate. Although leading religious dignitaries and lower-ranking imams generally supported the nationalist chiefs, they also formed benevolent societies (jamCiyyat) which assumed a militant anti-western and anti-secular political character by the mid-1930s and which eventually posed an unwelcome challenge to the authority of the nationalist leadership in the quarters.53
The qabadday, in contrast, posed no such threat. He hailed from the common people, was under the protection of the bey, was often indebted to him for loans and services, and, in any case, lacked the education, status, and statesman-like
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qualities to reach the bey's level of political leadership. Thus, while the National Bloc leader, assisted by his personal secretary and family, policed the core of his patronage network, the qaba.day looked after its periphery, servicing it directly whenever possible and guaranteeing its support when the bey required it.54
Although some qaba.dayat were able to attract their own personal followings by performing such services as the mediation of disputes, the protection of the neighborhood, and small philanthropic activities, they had neither direct control nor access to large material resource bases which might have allowed them to build their own independent patronage networks. In the final analysis, they were beholden to the politicians in many of the same ways that other clients were. The only significant difference was that the qaba.diy's apparatus for recruiting and policing his bey's clientele gave him direct access to the bey's immediate entourage, in particular to his personal secretary. In this way, the qabadlay could count on preferential treatment and a few more privileges than could the average client on the periphery of the bey's network.55 Although the scope for social mobility was not wide, a number of qaba.dayat managed to enrich themselves through connections with their patrons.
At any given time the residents of a quarter might refer to several individuals as qaba.dayat. A quarter could support more than one strongman, although it was not uncommon to associate the qaba.dyat with a single family. Residents of Bab al-Jabiyya referred to "wildd al-Kilawi" (the sons of al-KilawT) as frequently as they did to any one member of the family. It was the family, through its connections, which provided protection and assistance to the quarter. Abui 'All did make a name for himself in particular as the family rabble-rouser, the gifted equestrian, and the local enforcer. But he frankly admitted that his oldest brother, who had some education, made the family's major decisions, ran its business, and dealt with the National Bloc politicians and their deputies. Abf 'All was in effect Abfi Hasan's lieutenant, prepared to execute his commands. When Abu Hasan died, the leadership of the Kilawi family passed to Abf 'Ali (his other brother was regarded as a high-liver and a playboy, which disqualified him), who had already begun to educate his eldest son to fill the role of family lieutenant.56
Part of the mythology surrounding the qabaday was that he never took money from politicians or their secretaries, or from merchants in the quarter for carrying out various instructions, such as mobilizing the youth of the quarter to demonstrate or enforcing a strike or boycott. Abu 'All admitted that the Bloc offered him money at various times and cited serveral attempts by merchants close to the Bloc to pay him to keep the General Strike of 1936 going.57 Defending the ideal image of a qaba.day, he also claimed that to accept such offerings ran against his honor. He did not deny, however, that some qaba.dayat broke this code of personal honor and morality by accepting cash and other benefits for merely fulfilling their duties. In the long, narrow, socially heterogeneous al-Maydan to the city's south, the Bloc's problems were of a different order and magnitude. There, the social tensions and dislocations produced by the unsettling effects of increasing inmigration kept political power fragmented. Although the Maydan, unlike Hayy al-Akrad, contributed heavily in blood and sweat to the cause of independence (the French bombarded it from the air twice during the Great Revolt, nearly destroying the entire quarter), those al-Maydani families who could claim influence were never closely linked to the National Bloc. Some, like the great merchant aghawat of Sukkar and al-Mahayni, assisted the Bloc only when they wanted to and were not intimately tied to any Bloc chief's political machine. Others, like the Hakim family, opposed the National Bloc, supporting its major rival faction headed by Dr. CAbd al-Rahman Shahbandar, the recognized leader of the Great Revolt.61
Although there is no single explanation for why the Maydan evaded the influence of the National Bloc, the Bloc was clearly ill-equipped to mitigate the Maydan's social contradictions, to ameliorate its poverty, general squalor, and unsettledness, and hence to integrate and organize its population for political action. This left the area vulnerable to politicization by more socially conscious forces, ranging from Muslim benevolent societies to modern radical political organizations like the Communist and Ba'th parties, which could better provide Syrian Urban Politics in Transition 527 a suitable and effective framework for integration. In a wider context, the rapid pace of urbanization during the Mandate was not accompanied by the kind of industrialization that could have provided this growing pool of unskilled labor with jobs which would have brought it under some form of social and political control.62
BEYOND THE QUARTERS
Although the popular quarters remained important units of political and social organization as their internal structures and interrelations changed during the Mandate, their importance to the independent movement declined. The advancement of urban political life had produced new focal points outside the quarters. These were the modern institutions which, from their inception, were closely identified with the growth of a professional middle class whose fundamental interests lay beyond the quarters. The dominant sentiments of this class of lawyers, doctors, engineers, educators, journalists, and other members of the intelligentsia transcended the narrowness of quarter life; their primary loyalties were to the city, state, and the nation rather than to the family, clan, confessional group, or quarter.
The importance of the modern middle class to the development of the independence movement in Syria grew with time. Although it was intimately involved in the birth of the Arab nationalist movement in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, and its members could be found in all secret nationalist societies before and during World War I, it really only began to have a significant impact on political life in the 1930s.63 Many factors were behind its ascent at this time, all of which were connected to changes in the structure of Syrian society that had been occurring since late Ottoman times. But among the most important factors was the development of modern secular education, which only became available to social strata below the upper class during the Mandate period. The addition of the professional middle class to the ranks of the nationalist movement involved a generation of individuals who were younger than the leadership of the National Bloc. Moreover, this generation was not as tainted by the Ottoman experience and legacy, and it possessed a higher level of education than that of its elders in the Bloc.
The number of primary and secondary school students in government institutions nearly doubled between 1924 and 1934.64 The Syrian University also expanded in this period, and opportunities opened for the brightest high school and university graduates to go to France on scholarships for advanced studies in a wide variety of fields, (in particular, law, medicine, and teacher-training). All of these factors certainly played a role in broadening the horizons of the urban youth and in shifting the focus of their activities out of the quarters and into modern institutions and structures. This new focus, in turn, helped to supplant their traditional loyalties with new ones, most notably with nationalism. But although modern education paved the way for social mobility and afforded middle-class status, it did not necessarily guarantee middle-class incomes. Rising but unfulfilled expectations created a vast reservoir of frustration and antagonism which the Syrian nationalist leadership had to channel to its own ends. Otherwise, it stood to sacrifice its potential influence in what was rapidly becoming the most dynamic sector of Syrian society. The National Bloc also recognized that the new educated cadres were in need of leaders with whom they could identify socially, culturally, and intellectually. Traditionally educated and attired merchants and religious leaders, and the semi-literate qaba.idaiat of the popular quarters, were bound to be ineffective as role models for the rising middle classes. A new set of leaders, more closely attuned to their needs and conscious of their aspirations, had to emerge to service the educated youth.
The National Bloc discovered early on that the major source of disaffected, educated youth in Damascus (and in other cities) was the expanding government school system. There, already grouped together, were thousands of students being inculcated daily with patriotic ideals by Syrian instructors and, as a result, drifting away from the influence of the traditional quarters with their increasingly archaic and outmoded social and cultural norms. School life temporarily freed these young people from the entanglements of family obligations and careers.65 Their growing political awareness coupled with their youthful lack of inhibitions could be translated into major support for the National Bloc. All that was wanting was some force to harness their unbridled energy.
Not long after its establishment, the National Bloc began to turn its attention to developing a youth wing from among high school and university students. In 1929, such an organization was born -the Nationalist Youth (al-Shabab alWatani). As was often the case with the more innovative National Bloc projects, the propelling force behind the Nationalist Youth was Fakhri al-Baruidi. His interest in the educated young stemmed from several sources. His own fairly broad intellectual interests in literature, the arts, and Arabic music enabled him to stay in close touch with the main intellectual currents and fashions that attracted the young between the wars. His personal inheritance, which included large revenues from his family's farms around Damascus, allowed him to offer patronage to young talented journalists, poets, and musicians whom he encouraged to frequent his large home in al-Qanawat. It is not surprising that he preferred to spend much of his time cultivating the young, the educated, and the talented instead of building relations with qabadavyat as did his cousin and major rival in the National Bloc, Nasib al-Bakri. BarudT was neither as conservative nor as rigid as Bakri, and although conscious of Arab traditions, he was much more discriminating in his choice of those he emphasized. He was clearly a politician with a vision of the future as well as one of the past.66
In addition, BarudT's immediate environment conditioned his decision to cultivate the educated youth. Al-Qanawat was largely populated by upper and upper-middle class Muslim families like his own who afforded their children the best local education available in Arabic. It seems that Baruid was impressed by the youth of his quarter and especially by their social and political awareness. He held out great hope for the coming generation of leaders. But he also felt that it was incumbent upon his generation to develop the talents and direct the energies on the second floor of his shop, and in no time it became a popular place in which to congregate. Its location beyond the quarters also afforded youngsters a certain degree of freedom from the watchful eye of the family, from traditional religious figures, and from qaba.didyt.
Eventually Bayriutf began to encourage small groups of students to gather at his store after school where they met older students from the university, especially the Law Faculty. They listened to discussions of critical political issues, talked over common problems, and read newspapers and the regular decrees of the High Commissioner. At these gatherings and, under Bayrtii's guidance, various courses of political action were plotted. By the late 1920s his shop had become a springboard for student demonstrations. With the Serail nearby, protestors did not have to go far to make their opinions heard.
As his following increased with each political activity born on the rue RamT, Bayriut felt a greater need to offer his students some regimentation. Impressed by the esprit de corps of the one Boy Scout troop in Damascus, the Ghuta Scouts, but unhappy that its leaders refused to engage the troop in political activities, Bayruti and a young activist medical student from al- This emerging generation of young men, who belonged to the professional middle class and who came from mercantile backgrounds, the old aristocracy of officials, or, increasingly from lower social origins, were inspired by ideologically advanced political organizations, which a number of them had witnessed during their student days in Europe in the twenties and thirties. On returning to Damascus and other cities they quickly grew impatient with the manner in which the popular classes were politically organized. They found the old-fashioned merchants, imams, and, above all, the qabadayat to be out of step with the changing times and hence to be obstacles to progress. But the more radical of these young men also became impatient with the loose and shifting associations of the absentee landowners and wealthy merchants who in alignment formed the effective leadership of the independence movement. They were disturbed by many facets of the National Bloc's organization: the clubby atmosphere and the panoply of family ties and personal relations binding it together; the maintenance of individual followings and the lack of subordination to party will and policy; and, by the 1930s, the lapse of the most critical principle of the movement -Arab unity. These young men were discouraged by the Bloc's narrowly focused strategy whose principal aim was not liberation but rather patient negotiations with the French in the hope of gradually relaxing their control over Syria, all without upsetting the political status quo.
In such circumstances, it was not long before the National Bloc leadership found its control over urban politics and the independence movement threatened by these rising elites. In order to survive, nationalist leaders had to stay in step with the times. This meant adjusting not only to the changes taking place in the older quarters, but even more particularly to the new institutions and organizations of urban political life that had arisen alongside the quarters, creating in the process a new balance of local power. By the end of the Mandate era, to maintain control of the independence movement and of the reigning idea of nationalism required, above all, a concentration of attention and resources in these new areas. The traditional style and methods of urban politics had reluctantly but clearly begun to give way. 
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